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DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION? 
Adam B. Cox* 
Thomas J. Miles** 
 
Judicial decisions provide a wealth of information—but information 
about what?  In recent years, the empirical study of judicial decisions has 
exploded in popularity as legal academics and social scientists have 
conducted statistical analyses of court decisions in many substantive 
areas of law.  The purpose of these empirical investigations is to learn 
something about the way in which judges decide cases.  Typically, these 
studies ask whether a judge’s identity or background—her ideological 
disposition, race, education, experience, and so forth—influence the 
way in which she decides cases.1  Rarely, and only when demanding 
conditions are met, have researchers looked to the success rates in 
published cases to glean information about the facts that underlie those 
lawsuits.  For good reasons, researchers have not considered the success 
rates in tort lawsuits in Illinois to be a solid source of information about 
the level of tortious conduct in the state.  Nor have they considered the 
conviction rates in criminal cases in New York to be a meaningful 
measure of the state’s crime level. 
Ellen D. Katz and Anna Baldwin’s response2 to our study, Judging the 
Voting Rights Act,3 overlooks this fundamental point.  They believe that 
the rate at which section 2 plaintiffs prevail in published judicial 
decisions reveals the level of discrimination in certain parts of the 
country at particular times.  More ambitiously, they believe that these 
dispositions provide a concrete measure of the present-day need for 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.4  We disagree.  Judicial decisions can 
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1. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1070283 (describing recent burst of studies on judicial decision making). 
2. Ellen D. Katz & Anna Baldwin, Why Counting Votes Doesn’t Add Up:  A Response 
to Cox and Miles’ Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 23 (2008), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/108/23_KatzBaldwin.pdf 
[hereinafter Katz & Baldwin, Counting Votes].   
3. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1 (2008). 
4. See Ellen D. Katz, Mission Accomplished?, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 142, 145 
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tell us much about how judges decide the cases presented to them.  But 
neither our study of voting rights decisions, Katz’s original examination 
of these decisions,5 nor Katz and Baldwin’s replication of our findings6 
can tell us whether discrimination against the voting rights of minorities 
is rampant or rare, or whether section 5 is as necessary today as it ever 
was.  Past decisions on section 2 claims simply cannot tell us the answers 
to these important questions. 
In this short essay, we explore which inferences are appropriately 
drawn from published judicial decisions and explain why we believe that 
Katz and Baldwin go astray when they attempt to infer the degree of 
discrimination from the rate of plaintiff success in published voting 
rights cases.  Our central disagreement with their approach is 
methodological.  But Katz and Baldwin do not focus on this difference.  
Instead, their reply principally critiques the way in which we measure the 
success rates of plaintiffs in our study.  Before turning to the larger 
methodological point, therefore, we first explain why this criticism is 
unwarranted. 
A.  Measuring Plaintiff Success Rates 
Because colloquies of this sort inevitably focus on points of 
disagreement, we should emphasize at the outset the broad areas of 
agreement between our work and Katz and Baldwin’s reply.  Our 
primary interest in studying judicial opinions issued in Voting Rights Act 
litigation was to understand whether a judge’s race or partisanship 
influenced her adjudication of section 2 claims.  Section 2 is designed to 
protect minority voting rights claims.  Moreover, section 2 litigation was 
in the past often thought to systematically favor the Democratic Party.  
These features of section 2 lawsuits raise the litigation’s partisan and 
racial salience and motivated our research. 
As Judging the Voting Rights Act details, we found that both race and 
partisanship exert powerful effects.  The likelihood that a judge votes in 
favor of section 2 is strongly influenced by both her partisan affiliation 
and her race.  Moreover, the partisan affiliation and race of the other 
judges with whom she sits also influence her voting behavior.  Katz and 
Baldwin agree with all of these findings.  In their response, they replicate 
our estimates of the effects of judicial ideology and race and have no 
disagreement with our primary conclusions.  Although Katz and Baldwin 
 
(2007), at http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/12/10/katz.html [hereinafter Katz, Mission 
Accomplished?] (describing comparative success rates in covered versus non-covered 
jurisdictions as a “concrete way to measure section 5’s success in covered jurisdictions”). 
5. See Ellen D. Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting:  Judicial Findings 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights 
Initiative,  39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643 (2006), available at 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights/files/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Katz et al., 
Documenting Discrimination]. 
6. Katz & Baldwin, Counting Votes, supra note 2, at 24. 
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downplay these findings, we believe that they have important 
implications for a variety of debates about the enforcement of minority 
voting rights and racial diversity in the federal judiciary. 
Katz and Baldwin’s disagreement, then, is not with our central 
findings.  Rather, they disagree with the interpretation we attach to one 
of the many control variables included in our regressions—whether the 
section 2 claim arose in a jurisdiction covered by the preclearance 
procedures of section 5.  Our baseline regression showed that when both 
trial and appellate judicial decisions on the merits were considered, 
section 5 coverage did not correlate with the likelihood that a judge 
votes in favor of liability under section 2.  In this specification, the 
coefficient on this control variable was less than ten percentage points 
and statistically insignificant.  Our finding conflicts with an earlier claim 
by Katz and Baldwin that section 5 coverage is a strong predictor of 
plaintiff success in section 2 cases.7  We reach different results because 
we make different decisions about how to test for a relationship between 
section 5 coverage and the success rates of section 2 plaintiffs. 
In Katz and Baldwin’s earlier work, they tested for this relationship 
by simply comparing the success rate in covered jurisdictions with 
uncovered ones.  In their reply, they abandon their earlier exclusive 
reliance on summary statistics and adopt wholesale the regression 
frameworks we specified.  But Katz and Baldwin critique our regression 
specifications on two grounds:  first, they argue that we wrongly focus on 
judge votes rather than judicial decisions (or final dispositions); second, 
they contend that we wrongly include appellate cases (rather than just 
trial cases) in our comparison groups. 
The first objection is beside the point.  Katz and Baldwin cast this 
criticism as a problem of miscounting:  they claim that we permit judge 
votes from panel decisions to enter the data set three times (one vote for 
each judge on the panel) while judge votes from judges presiding alone 
enter into the data set only once.8  But judge votes rather than decisions 
are the appropriate unit of analysis, because our primary interest is in 
judicial behavior.  Moreover, our central conclusions about the influence 
of judicial ideology and race are the same regardless of which way we 
analyze the data.  At the decision level, the likelihood that the court 
favors a section 2 plaintiff rises if the presiding trial judge is a 
Democratic appointee or an African American; and for panel decisions, 
the likelihood of a plaintiff victory rises with the number of Democratic 
appointees and African Americans on the panel.  Katz and Baldwin 
prove this point themselves, as their decision-level replication of our 
analysis produces nearly identical results. 
Katz and Baldwin’s second criticism is that we were wrong to include 
appellate cases in our analysis.  As we were careful to explain in Judging 
 
7. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 5, at 655. 
8. See Katz & Baldwin, Counting Votes, supra note 2, at 24. 
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the Voting Rights Act, and as Katz and Baldwin’s replication of our 
estimates confirms, section 5 coverage and liability do not correlate 
positively when both trial and appellate judge votes are grouped 
together.  But when the data are broken out by trial and appellate 
courts, strikingly different patterns emerge.  Trial courts in covered 
jurisdictions have higher liability rates than uncovered ones, while 
appellate courts have liability rates that are lower in covered jurisdictions 
than in uncovered ones.  These patterns obtain irrespective of whether 
judge votes or court decisions are the units of analysis. 
This finding—that the positive relationship between liability and 
coverage exists only at the trial stage—contrasts with the claim that Katz 
previously made.9  She claimed that coverage increases the likelihood of 
liability without qualification as to the stage of litigation.  Our evidence, 
relying on multiple regression analysis and a deeper probing of the data, 
showed that Katz’s initial claim was incomplete.  In their response to us, 
Katz and Baldwin now concede that coverage correlates with liability only 
at the trial stage. 
In view of the oppositely-signed estimates on the controls for section 
5 coverage at the trial and appellate levels, we are cautious about what 
conclusions, if any, can be reached from these data about the impact of 
section 5 coverage on liability.  Katz and Baldwin, in contrast, attach 
strong interpretations to these estimates.  They champion the positive 
correlation at the trial stage as judicial “fact find[ings]”10 of 
discrimination while discounting the negative correlation at the 
appellate stage as “reveal[ing] little about the underlying claim[s]” of 
discrimination.11  These interpretations require Katz and Baldwin to 
make almost diametrically opposed assumptions about the processes 
generating these data.  They assume that the success rate in the trial 
courts is driven almost solely by differences in the actual levels of 
discrimination, while appellate court decisions “hinge on a host of 
factors not tied directly to [section 5] coverage or its absence.”12 
These interpretations are not hypotheses that the data have 
confirmed.  Rather, they are assertions about the patterns observed in 
the data, assertions at variance with Katz’s original claims.  The tasks of 
trial and appellate judges surely differ, but it is implausible that they 
diverge so widely as to render trial decisions an accurate measure of 
discrimination and appellate decisions something else entirely.  
Moreover, Katz and Baldwin’s account of trial and appellate courts is 
somewhat inconsistent with other claims they advance.  Later in their 
reply, they invert their own assumption that trial decisions reflect facts 
 
9. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 5, at 655. 
10. Katz & Baldwin, Counting Votes, supra note 2, at 25.  This statement is in some 
contrast with their replication of our estimates, which confirms that ideology, a factor 
outside of the merits of a case, influences the conclusions that trial courts reach. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
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while appellate decisions do not:  they interpret the pattern of appellate 
decisions in covered jurisdictions as evidence that those appellate courts 
may be curtailing the excesses of trial judges—in other words, that trial 
court judges in covered jurisdictions may “have read section 2 too 
restrictively,” such that appellate court reversals become a better 
indicator of the true level of discrimination.13 
B.  The Significance of Success Rates 
Katz and Baldwin’s conflicting interpretations of trial and appellate 
decisions point to the larger methodological question:  How should we 
interpret differences in liability rates across different courts, places, or 
time periods?  Katz and Baldwin believe that liability rates at the trial 
level are direct evidence of the level of voting rights problems.14  Thus, 
they use differences in (trial-level) litigation success rates across 
jurisdictions to measure differences in the levels of discrimination.  We 
believe it is a mistake to draw such strong inferences from the similarities 
or differences in plaintiff success rates in different places or times. 
The central methodological difficulty with Katz and Baldwin’s 
claims is that they draw inferences about the extent of discrimination 
and the efficacy of section 5 from a sample of cases that is almost surely 
not representative of the entire class of voting rights claims.  As George 
L. Priest and Benjamin Klein recognized nearly 25 years ago, “[i]f all 
legal disputes . . . were tried to judgment and then appealed, the 
inference from legal rules to social behavior would be 
straightforward. . . . It is well known, however, that only a very small 
fraction of disputes comes to trial and an even smaller fraction is 
appealed.”15  Moreover, the sample of cases that reach trial or appeal are 
“peculiar” in that they likely are not representative of the typical 
dispute.16  In asserting that plaintiff win rates are accurate measures of 
discrimination, Katz and Baldwin overlook this fundamental obstacle in 
drawing inferences from judicial decisions. 
In Judging the Voting Rights Act, we recognize this problem, but it is 
not nearly as vexing for the set of questions we address.  First, the scope 
 
13. Id. 
14. To be clear, Katz and Baldwin are a bit ambiguous about exactly what they think 
success rates are evidence of.  They variously suggest that liability rates are evidence of 
“obstacles to minority political participation,” id. at 23, or of the prevalence of “voting 
problems,” Katz, Mission Accomplished?, supra note 4, at 142, or of “the persistence of 
discrimination,” Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 5, at 657.  These 
definitions leave some uncertainty about what underlying fact Katz and Baldwin hope to 
measure, whether it is the raw number of discriminatory laws or practices, the number of 
people subject to discriminatory practices or the egregiousness of discrimination, or 
something else. 
15. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.  
Legal Stud. 1, 1–2 (1984). 
16. Id. at 2. 
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of our inquiry—how a judge’s characteristics influence her 
decisionmaking in cases she is called upon to decide—does not require 
us to make claims about the full distribution of possible or actual section 
2 claims or the behavior and characteristics of litigants.  That is, we look 
to these data to inform our understanding of judges rather than to suss 
out underlying rates of discrimination.  Second, the roughly random 
assignment of cases to judges within judicial districts and circuits 
constitutes a sort of natural experiment.  The randomization of cases 
across judges implies that, to a first approximation, a judge’s 
characteristics will be uncorrelated with the strength of the case.  If these 
characteristics of judges then correlate with the manner in which they 
decide these cases, it is reasonable to infer that the characteristics have a 
causal impact on their decisions. 
As a further check on our primary findings, we include control 
variables for various features of the cases.  But we interpret these only as 
controls, not as causal influences.  Inferences drawn from them about 
underlying rates of discrimination could be erroneous (or in statistical 
argot, biased) because, as Priest and Klein observed, not all possible 
disputes are litigated through trial and appeal.  Some are not litigated at 
all, and others proceed only through certain stages of litigation.  “For 
the rate of plaintiff verdicts to be an accurate measure of the influence 
of a legal standard, . . . litigated disputes must be representative of the 
entire class of underlying disputes.”17  As a general matter, the selection 
of disputes for litigation leaves no reason to believe that such disputes 
are so representative. 
For these reasons, in other litigation contexts we would seldom 
think it appropriate to interpret success rates as strong evidence of the 
social behavior underlying litigation.  Were we to find that the success 
rate of personal injury plaintiffs was higher in Illinois than Michigan, 
should we take that as evidence that torts are more prevalent in Illinois?  
Similarly, should we treat criminal arrest or conviction rates as good 
evidence of the prevalence of crime?  We do not think so.18  But 
regardless of what we think, there are only two options:  either Katz and 
Baldwin must disagree with our general methodological position—in 
which case they must take the position that litigant success rates, such as 
criminal conviction rates, are generally good evidence of the prevalence 
of the social behavior underlying the litigation—or they must explain 
why it is uniquely appropriate to draw these inferences in voting rights 
litigation.  Katz and Baldwin do not defend either position. 
Instead of taking a position on these methodological questions, Katz 
and Baldwin rely on a relatively ad hoc approach to dealing with 
 
17. Id. at 4. 
18. Cf. Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Crime on the Court, 92 J. Pol. 
Econ. 223 (1984) (showing that arrest rates may reflect enforcement rates as well as 
offending rates). 
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selection problems.  Where the patterns in the data show differences in 
success rates consistent with their conclusion about the importance of 
section 5, they accept those patterns as evidence of the prevalence of 
discrimination.  But when the data do not show such a difference, they 
craft a story about the selection of disputes to explain why we should not 
expect to see the difference that does not appear. 
Moreover, even were we to accept Katz and Baldwin’s contention 
that trial-level liability rates are good evidence of whether voting 
problems remain more prevalent in covered jurisdictions, we remain 
puzzled by their ultimate conclusion.  Their central claim is that that 
“obstacles to minority political participation remain more prevalent in 
‘covered’ jurisdictions.”19  To support this claim, they compute average 
differences over the entire period of study, 1982–2004.  But an average 
difference over two decades does not fit their claim that a difference 
remains today between covered and uncovered jurisdictions.  Similarities 
or differences in recent years would seem much more important.  After 
all, differences that existed fifteen or twenty years ago cannot tell them 
whether obstacles to minority participation continue today. 
In fact, the data reveal that liability patterns in covered and 
uncovered jurisdictions have changed dramatically over time.  In the first 
decade of the study, trial courts in covered jurisdictions were indeed 
more likely to find liability than courts in uncovered areas.  But from 
1994 to the end of the study in 2004, plaintiff success rates were nearly 
identical in covered and uncovered trial courts.  These patterns imply 
that the difference between these trial courts on which Katz and Baldwin 
rely is almost exclusively the product of differences that existed in the 
past but which disappeared over time.20 
What should we make of this convergence over time in plaintiff 
success rates?  Given Katz and Baldwin’s methodological approach, one 
might think that they would have to conclude from this convergence that 
discrimination today is no worse in covered than uncovered jurisdictions.  
We disagree.  We think it would be premature to interpret this 
convergence as evidence that problems in covered jurisdictions are no 
longer any worse than in the rest of the country.  Regardless of our 
position, however, the important point is that the significance of the 
convergence turns centrally on what methodological approach one 
adopts.  
 
 
 
 
19. Katz & Baldwin, Counting Votes, supra note 2, at 23. 
20. As we pointed out in Judging the Voting Rights Act, a closely related trend appears 
in the overall data as well.  Liability rates have been steadily falling for over two decades in 
section 2 litigation.  We took pains in our earlier work to emphasize that one should not 
be quick to assume that this means that voting discrimination is on the wane. 
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